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The 9th annual Dairy Seminar, sponsored jointly by the Ohio Milk Pro-
ducers Federation, the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, and the Ohio Cooperative 
Extension Service, was held on March 4-5, 1975. The focal point of this 
seminar concerned the financing problem as faced by dairy marketing coopera-
tives. Because of his review of major dairy cooperatives in the Northeast 
that have faced serious financing questions, the Program Committee asked 
Mr. William Monroe, Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, to serve as the key resource person for the seminar. A response panel 
including Eldie Vickrey, General Manager, Miami Valley Milk Producers Associa-
tion, and Robert Brewer, President, Cincinnati Cooperative Milk Sales Associa-
tion provided their reactions to Mr. Monroe's presentation. 
This monograph reports Mr. Monroe's rem.arks together with the responses 
of Mr. Vickrey and Mr. Brewer. The information should be particularly useful 
to members of dairy marketing cooperatives, directors of dairy cooperatives, 
and management of these cooperatives as they face financing questions on a 
continuing basis. 
The Dairy Seminar pursued other issues in milk marketing during its 
sessions, but only the financing topic has been recorded. 
Program Committee: 
S. C. Cashman, Ohio Farm Bureau 
Federation 
Donald Zehr, Ohio Milk Producers 
Federation 
Robert E. Jacobson, The Ohio State 
University 
FINANCING OF DAIRY COOPERATIVE FACILITIES AND MARKETING PROGRAMS 
William J. Monroe 
Farmer Cooperative Service 
U.S. Department of Agriculture 
It is a pleasure to be here today and to have the opportunity to dis-
cuss financing of cooperative facilities. The assigned topic is very approp-
riate at this time for two reasons. First, cooperatives are accepting more 
and more of the responsibility for providing the facilities needed to market 
milk further down the line to the consumer; and this is requiring large 
amounts of capital. Second, cooperatives, as we have read and heard, are 
having their financial problems. 
Before we look at the problems and needs of cooperative facility f inan-
cing in the dairy industry, we should look very briefly at financing of coop-
erative facilities in general. Such financing requires relatively large 
amounts of both debt and equity capital. Equity capital provides the neces-
sary element of ownership and control. It is the risk capital. It serves 
as a buffer to absorb operating losses and any shrinkage in asset value. 
Members contribute equity to their cooperatives by (1) investing some 
or all of their savings or margins; (2) purchasing capital stock or other se-
curities; and (3) investing capital retains. 
The invested savings method is used most extensively. About three out of 
every four dollars of equity capital have been acquired by cooperatives from 
savings distributed as patronage refunds and reinvested by patrons. 
Marketing cooperatives of ten use the third method-per unit capital re-
tains. More than a third of the total equity of marketing cooperatives has 
been contributed by patrons through this method. 
The financing needs faced by dairy cooperatives can be appreciated by 
noting their scope of involvement in the milk industry. 
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In 1967 cooperatives were furnishing the facilities for producing about 
75 percent of the non-fat dried milk, 65 percent of the butter, 30 percent 
of the American cheese, 15 percent of the cottage cheese, 10 percent of the 
packaged fluid milk, and 5 percent of the ice cream produced in the United 
States. We believe these percentages have increased during the past 8 years. 
In an effort to determine what cooperatives are doing lately, Farm.er Coop-
erative Service (FCS) recently surveyed the receipts and utilization of all 
the dairy cooperatives in the United States. We believe that cooperatives 
are not only making more manufactured products today than they did in 1967 
but are also processing and packaging more fluid milk. It appears to us 
that the processing and packaging of fluid milk is being taken over more 
and more by chain stores and dairy cooperatives. It also appears that coop-
eratives are getting more and more into the food processing business. 
If these two trends continue, the cooperatives' needs for additional 
financing will grow astronomically. Where will these cooperatives get this 
money and what new problems will this bring to the management of cooperatives? 
Now, if we see cooperatives in the future as large integrated, multi-
purpose, organizations with multi-product, multi-plant operations, then we 
may want to look at some of the problems these types of cooperatives have 
had in the past to see what may be in the future. 
There are several large multi-plant, multi-product manufacturing coop-
eratives with significant manufacturing and bottling operations. A few of 
these are new to the industry and their histories are short. Some appear 
to be quite successful. 
But all is not sweet and light. Over the past year or two several 
cooperatives that integrated vertically into the packaged fluid milk busi-
ness have had to retreat to live and fight another day. 
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We have also seen over the past year several relatively large multi-
product, multi-plant cooperatives that were for years eminently successful 
come upon hard times. Two of these are in New York and Pennsylvania. Per-
haps we might learn something from these that would be helpful to others. 
I'm sure all of you are familiar with the problems of the New York and 
Pennsylvania cooperatives. Much has been written about them in the papers, 
some true and some fiction. 
I don't want to set out these two cooperatives as bad examples. Their 
situations are more the results of their marketing environment than of any 
improper action or poor judgments. They had had a history of very success-
ful operations. It has only been the past few years that they have had fi-
nancial problems. 
What were the difficulties that created the financial problems which 
finally erupted into headlines? Are these two cooperatives only the first 
of many others to follow or was each of their situations one of a kind, 
unique in origin, singular in effect, inevitable in result? In other words, 
do we have anything to worry about as directors, managers, or educators in 
terms of cooperative structure, operation or finance? Are cooperatives 
equipped financially to take on the enlarged function of marketing their 
members' milk in a changing and highly competitive industry? 
We in FCS have worked and are presently working with these two coopera-
tives and are quite familiar with their operations. What I have to say to-
day regarding them can be gleaned from their published information. I will 
be unable to discuss any problem or provide any information that we have re-
ceived in confidence. 
Although there are differences in the operations of these two coopera-
tives, there are similarities in most respects. First, let us describe the 
New York cooperative's situation by listing those factors which we believe 
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had a significant bearing on its problem. These factors are: 
1. The New York cooperative marketed milk in several Federal and State 
Order markets in the Northeast. The largest portion of its milk is marketed 
in New York-New Jersey Federal Order 2. This market is a highly competitive 
market for both raw fluid milk and packaged milk. The cooperatives in this 
market lack the unified marketing action that prevails in other large mar-
kets. Cooperatives in the New York market had until recently looked first 
to the Federal Order to solve most of their marketing problems rather than 
through coordinated action. By so doing they have solved some of their 
short-run problems only to have created more difficult long-run problems. 
One example was the problem of accounting for and pricing milk with the ad-
vent of bulk tank assembly. Farm point pricing was initiated as a solution 
and the cooperative became directly responsible for costs of hauling its 
members' milk. Although handlers and cooperatives were authorized to deduct 
a charge for this hauling, cooperatives did not put this charge into effect. 
Consequently, the prevailing Order 2 philosophy of "free hauling" for produc-
ers has magnified the New York cooperative's other problems in obtaining 
break-even operations of its plants. 
2. The New York cooperative has a relatively small share of the total 
Order 2 market. Therefore, it is unable by itself to greatly influence the 
terms of sales of its milk. Cooperatives have about 69 percent of producers 
in the New York-New Jersey market. Non-members in Order 2 have increased 
between 2 and 3 percent in the past two or three years. 
3. The New York cooperative packaged and sold a large portion of its 
own milk. It marketed packaged fluid milk throughout the states of New York 
and New Jersey. It operated several milk processing plants and large numbers 
of distribution facilities. In the late 1960's it entered the gre~ter North-
east milk market with the purchase of a Boston milk company. The New York 
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cooperative never was able to bring that operation into a profitable posi-
tion. The losses from this operation drained away needed operating capital 
from other operations. 
4. The New York cooperative manufactured its milk not needed for Class 
I use into a large variety of manufactured products. This required several 
large investments in processing and manufacturing facilities. The New York 
cooperative was responsible along with NEDCO for the market clearing function 
for the entire market. Both cooperatives have experienced difficulty in op-
erating these supply balancing plants on a profitable basis. Further, be-
cause of lack of coordination in the market they were unable to recover these 
losses with over-order prices. In addition, the New York cooperative did not 
have enough surplus milk in any one area to assure a profitable year-round, 
high-volume manufacturing plant to offset losses in its butter-NFDM operation. 
5. The New York cooperative, as did most of the cooperatives in the 
Northeast, paid producer-members competitive Federal Order prices for milk 
rather than operate a net pool. I will enlarge on the significance of this 
policy later. 
6. The New York cooperative's capital structure was based on per unit 
capital retains and invested savings or margins. These were evidenced by 
Certificates of Indebtedness and Certificates of Investments with a fixed 
due date. These certificates carried a competitive interest rate. Further, 
the New York cooperative maintained a market for its equity certificates so 
that farmers could get their money out of them prior to the due date. 
7. In 1973, two New York cooperatives organized CMA to perform their 
combined marketing activities in Order 2 with respect to (1) farm-to-plant 
milk hauling, (2) quality control field service, (3) raw milk sales, and 
(4) supply balancing and surplus milk disposal. 
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We recognize the problems in the New York cooperative's operations, but 
~e believe that it properly has accepted the role of being a full service 
cooperative in the market. We also recognize that costs of providing full 
service to members cannot always be covered by the market price of milk and 
~ilk products. 
What were the consequences of the practices and policies outlined? The 
consequences were consistent operating losses of varying magnitudes for sev-
eral years, culminating in a serious cash shortage and a severe financial 
situation. 
Why wasn't the New York cooperative able to make the adjustments in op-
erations needed to correct its downward trend in financial condition? I be-
lieve that it did not adjust sooner because, first, the farmer-members did 
not recognize the significance of the problem and, second, management be-
lieved that actions taken to improve operating efficiency would eventually 
offset the losses. In the late 60's and early 70's the cooperative's first 
reaction to the losses was to try to correct them through improved efficiency 
in operations. The cooperative did take several steps of consolidating opera-
tions and closing plants but the cooperative was unable to create enough ef-
ficiencies to break even. Therefore, deficits continue. 
It is questionable whether any full service cooperative servicing such 
a large, diverse market as Order 2 could ever create efficiencies in opera-
tions to fully cover costs. Without over-order prices it is virtually cer-
tain a loss position would continue. 
The major policy that has created the financial problem for the New 
York cooperative as distinguished from its operating or marketing problem--
is the one of paying producer members a competitive price for milk regard-
less of the ability of the cooperative to return that price. Such a policy 
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is a trade-off between impaired equity versus higher current cash returns. 
Although I believe this to be unwise policy, I can recognize the New 
York cooperative's reasons for maintaining it through the years when the 
losses occurred. The cooperative officials argue, with some justification, 
that a reduction in members' pay price for milk relative to other coopera-
tives members' pay price from other cooperatives or other handlers pay 
price would cause them to lose membership and volume. This in turn would 
place a heavier burden on the remaining members and cause further losses 
in membership. 
My major argument against following a policy of overpaying producers 
is that this plan hides from members the true significance of other operat-
ing and marketing policies. As long as farmers are receiving a competitive 
price for their product, they may be reluctant to demand and support changes 
in operations needed to eliminate the losses. Although the aggregate equity 
of the cooperative is visibly impaired, farmer members' impairment of indi-
vidual equity is less visible. Consequently, members are slower to advocate 
adjustments in policies needed to correct their problems, and management 
hopes that future earnings will be available to off set these unallocated 
losses. This is risky. 
When farmer-members are not asked or are not willing to provide adequate 
capital, a cooperative is forced to borrow money to off set losses and to main-
tain working capital. The additional borrowing adds to the total cost of the 
operations and, if marketing conditions or operating procedures are not 
changed, losses will be magnified. The cooperative is then less and less able 
to operate profitably due to the higher interest costs. This is essentially 
what occurred in the New York cooperative. The cooperative recognized that 
this was becoming a serious problem. In October, 1974, its treasurer stated, 
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"The interest we pay • is one of the most important factors that has put 
red ink on our books." He further stated the problem: "No business could 
be expected to operate successfully if, on the first day of each year, it 
faced the necessity of earning 11 cents a hundredweight on all of its milk 
marketed before it could begin to pay its other expenses and earn a profit." 
In 1974, the cooperative made three major policy decisions that tell 
us a great deal in terms of what they believed to be the basic cause of 
their financial problem. The New York cooperative decided to: (1) Pay farm-
ers on a pool basis, that is, pay farmers only what the cooperative could 
earn from the sales of products less costs--in fact, they assessed producers 
for past overpayments. (2) Change financing from a totally revolving, inter-
est-bearing capital structure to a partial permanent capital structure, where-
by capital is to be revolved at the discretion of the Board. (3) Institute a 
profit-oriented operating policy under which each major department or product 
will have to pay its own costs and a share of the overhead. The cooperative 
believes these three policies will stop the financial drain on the coopera-
tive and will bring it into a financially sound and viable marketing organi-
zation again. 
If we look at the Pennsylvania cooperative we find that many of the 
same situations existed there as in New York. 
1. The Pennsylvania cooperative's operations were similar to the New 
York cooperative's except that since 1969 it did not market raw fluid milk. 
Its ma.nuf acturing operations were concentrated in one plant where the New 
York cooperative had several plants. 
2. The Pennsylvania cooperative processed, packaged and sold a large 
proportion of its own milk in three plants. Presently it has two bottling 
plants. It also had management contracts with two other processing coopera-
tives. The Pennsylvania cooperative's operation was first geared to selling 
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mainly on retail routes. Soon, after acquiring some additional facilities 
and after substantially remodeling them to fit retail route selling, it 
changed its marketing strategy to emphasize sales through chain stores. 
Chain store selling is highly competitive and can demand price concessions. 
In order to compete, a plant must have a very efficient operation. In 1974, 
it had just completed remodeling its Southeast Pennsylvania plant to gear it 
to the wholesale chain store market. 
3. In early 1974, the Pennsylvania cooperative had completed an exten-
sive building program in its manufacturing operations. It added a cheddar 
cheese operation, which required a greater volume of milk than was available 
from members and necessitated paying premiums to other sources to get the 
needed volume. 
4. In 1968, the Pennsylvania cooperative changed from paying producers 
on a pool basis to paying competitive prices. 
5. The Pennsylvania cooperative's capital structure earlier was based 
on per unit retains and reinvested earnings. Later these equities were con-
verted into cumulative, interest bearing, preferred stock. This stock is 
held by members and non-members and pays a competitive rate of interest. One 
of the difficulties of having a cooperative's equity capital held by non-
members is that non-members are concerned with returns on capital rather than 
services rendered and members may be less concerned with the operations than 
they should be. 
Most of what I said regarding the New York cooperative also applies to 
the Pennsylvania cooperative. The Pennsylvania cooperative's early actions 
to correct its problems were very similar to the New York cooperative's. 
Finally. the Pennsylvania cooperative has taken the same three policy posi-
tions regarding paying farmers, operating plants, and financing its organi-
zation. 
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What lessons can we learn from the experiences of these two cooperatives? 
I believe there are several major lessons to be learned. They are: 
1. Full service cooperatives that process and manufacture a significant 
portion of members' milk needed a substantial portion of its equity in perma-
nent capital without a due date. Dividends or interest should be paid only 
at the discretion of the Board of Directors when financial circumstances jus-
tify. We recognize that capital must earn its due and, further, we recognize 
the problem of fairness among members with different levels of investment when 
interest is not paid. However, one may argue, as one cooperative leader did 
when asked whether interest was to be paid on its stock, that no interest was 
to be paid in cash. He said members will receive interest and/or dividends 
on these invested funds in the form of higher prices through better utiliza-
tion of the milk supply and higher prices through greater flexibility in plant 
operations. 
2. Cooperatives must operate on the pool basis, paying farmers the re-
sidual after all costs are deducted from income. Exceptions to this policy 
should be made only in rare situations. 
3. Expansion programs should be undertaken only after detailed cost-
benefit analyses have been made and then these programs should be kept under 
tight cost control. Although we believe that cooperatives will do more pro-
cessing and packaging of fluid milk, any cooperative contemplating getting 
into this type of operation must take a long hard look at it. The market-
ing of packaged fluid milk is highly complicated and should be undertaken 
only if cooperatives are willing to acquire the expertise to successfully 
plan and manage it. Even if a cooperative is now successfully marketing 
packaged milk in one market, that does not mean necessarily it can market 
successfully in another market. 
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4. Cooperatives should operate under the policy that all major de-
partments or functions must contribute to the overhead of the organization. 
5. Cooperatives should maintain a timely, detailed accounting and 
information system which provides management with an up-to-date, accurate 
situation report. 
6. A re-evaluation should be made of any revolving fund in which a 
particular portion of the capital is revolved on a predetermined basis. 
Can these cooperatives as well as others provide the large amounts of 
future capital necessary by using the old methods of revolving fund finan-
cing or are new ways of financing going to be required? 
I'm sure that new ways of financing will be found. Investors other 
than farmers will be providing some of the financing. But when we look at 
the uniqueness of cooperatives we know that one cannot stray far from the 
principle that the users must furnish a substantial part of the capital. 
If farmers are going to control their organization they must also furnish 
the equity capital. Where your money is, that is where your heart and head 
will be. 
I believe that cooperatives can achieve adequate financing in the fu-
ture if they have a balance of the following financing methods. 
1. A base capital plan - a permanent capital program in which, after 
total capital needs are determined, each member or patron contributes a net 
amount of equity capital in proportion to his use of the cooperative and re-
ceives no interest. This is to provide a degree of fairness in terms of in-
vestment. 
2. A traditional revolving fund plan in which each year, at the discre-
tion of the board, a portion of the oldest equity capital is returned to 
members. 
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3. A permanent capital fund in which interest is paid annually on 
equity capital, but date of redemption is at the discretion of the board of 
directors. Level of investment by individual members may vary considerably. 
4. Borrowed capital from lending institutions, with the Bank for Coop-
eratives being the major lender. 
5. Special purpose financing - such as industrial revenue bonds or 
lease financing. 
6. For some of the larger cooperatives - leveraged leasing. 
I don't pretend to know what a proper balance of these types of financ-
ing should be. I suspect that the proper balance would be somewhat different 
for each cooperative. As cooperatives get larger and capital needs increase, 
members may have to shift some of the risk to outside investors. The use of 
leverage can result in a favored position for cooperative membership, but 
certainly for only as long as the cooperative is able to realize a greater 
return on its assets than it pays interest on debt. 
In closing I would emphasize five major considerations which are very 
important for dairy cooperatives in planning or adjusting their financial 
structure. 
1. They must generate more permanent capital to replace or supplement 
traditional revolving types of capital. 
2. They must assure that the member-user provides the major portion of 
equity capital. 
3. They must maintain equitable membership participation in providing 
equity capital. 
4. They should maximize, within strict limits, financial leverage. 
5. They must maintain a sound financial structure by - operating ef-
ficiently, and paying members only the pool value of milk. 
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6. Directors of cooperatives must take care in seeing that the organi-
zation does not outgrow the capabilities of its management. 
Response of Eldie Vickrey, General Manager 
Miami Valley Milk Producers Association 
It is a pleasure to appear on the Dairy Seminar program and to work 
with Mr. Monroe. I could merely say I agree with the statements Mr. Monroe 
made and sit down; however, I think you expect me to do a little more than 
that. Mr. Monroe cited the operation of two dairy cooperatives in the North-
east and some of the problems that have developed with which they have struggled 
the past several months. While some of the problems might be unique to those 
coops and the area in which they operate, they certainly could develop and 
become identical problems in other areas. 
The remarks that I make will, by necessity, be drawn from my experience 
with cooperatives with which I have worked and particularly Miami Valley 
Milk Producers Ass'n. I believe a few things are very basic and very neces-
sary if a cooperative is going to survive and build a strong, viable organi-
zation in these times. A coop must be soundly financed and a substantial 
portion of the capital must be contributed by its members. At a recent meet-
ing of Yankee Milk, their president, Louis Longo, made the statement that he 
felt that the equity capital provided by its members should be at least 35% 
and Yankee Milk is currently at 17%; and therefore members were being asked 
to increase the capital contributions. It is my opinion that 35% is the 
very minimum and if the rate of inflation the past couple of years continues, 
we might well need to increase to 50%. It is always a matter of concern to 
the Board of Directors as to the best method of financing the coop. Some 
of the coops have set a certain amount of capital deduction per cwt. of milk 
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while others have established a percentage of the gross milk check as the 
capital deduction. It seems to me that a percentage basis is the most equit-
able means, because as the milk price moves up or down then the contribution 
maintains the same relationship, while a flat amount per cwt. does not and 
in some cases we find the contributions being the same with a blend price of 
better than $9 as when the blend price was $4.50. Regardless of the means 
of obtaining capital deductions, they would be evidenced to the membership 
by certificates, which in our case we call Certificates of Indebtedness. 
These are revolving certificates which have a set period of time at which 
they will be redeemed. In the case of Miami Valley Milk Producers Ass'n 
the certificates stipulate that they will be revolved in 15 years and we 
have been revolving them on a 7 year basis. One of the advantages and 
strengths of a coop is the revolving of these certificates where a large 
part of your capital is contributed by the membership that is using the coop 
and by revolving the certificates, the member realizes it is an investment 
and not a flat charge. 
The Preferred Stock that a number of coops have can be considered as a 
permanent type of capital and I feel that in the years ahead where the coops 
will have the responsibilities, as Mr. Monroe pointed out, of particularly 
handling and processing most of their product, we need to consider ways of 
having more permanent capital. 
Another important part of financing of coops is the hiring by the Board 
of Directors a good auditing firm and the auditing firm should, yes I would 
say ~' be responsible to the Board of Directors so that they are aware of 
their financial condition. It is equally important that good management be 
hired and as a part of his responsibilities provide the Board of Directors 
a good monthly operating statement, covering current operations of the coop-
erative. 
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In conclusion, a cooperative, whether it be a milk coop, a grain coop, 
livestock or any other coop, to be successful must be well financed. It 
must have a Board of Directors that are willing to spend the time and effort 
to establish a sound fiscal policy, hire a capable manager, dedicated and 
willing to carry out those sound policies and hire an auditing firm to pro-
vide an annual audit report and perhaps meet with the Board of Directors at 
various times throughout the year. As our cooperatives are getting to be 
big business, they can and must be run on good sound business principles. 
Response of Robert Brewer, President, 
Cincinnati Cooperative Milk Sales Association 
The subject is two-fold in application as reference is made to financ-
ing facilities and also marketing programs. 
First, a milk marketing cooperative or a milk marketing division of a 
cooperative that markets raw milk for its patrons, collects and pays the 
patrons the proceeds from the sale of the milk, will need finances in addi-
tion to the regular dues collected from patrons. The additional funds are 
needed at times because of slow payments from receiving handlers and the re-
sulting need for the cooperative to provide those funds in paying patrons. 
The cooperative then must have reserves or a line of credit sufficient to 
cover accounts receivable resulting from the sale of raw milk. 
A cooperative's marketing program should be adequate to the service 
demands of members and the market and be adequately financed to provide an 
environment conducive to achieving the ultimate in fluid sales. This type 
of program benefits all patrons and the costs should be financed by all pa-
trons. 
Secondly, the facilities of a cooperative should be owned by the members. 
Each member should provide equity capital in direct proportion to his use 
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of the cooperative and in sufficient amount over a period of time to fully 
finance ownership. Ownership should be vested in current membership, this 
is accomplished by a revolving plan and a capital refund plan to retiring 
members. I endorse the financing principles as enumerated by Mr. Monroe. 
Short and long range planning and policy are necessary by management 
and boards of directors to avoid burdensome commitments. Board policy 
should not be determined by tradition but should accommodate actual needs. 
Board policy and management technique should be flexible to accommodate mem-
ber and market requirements as changes occur in the industry. 
Management practices and procedures used must be able to determine cur-
rent financial positions and forecast future needs. 
Financial reporting systems should be in specific detail to provide 
current information to management and to the Board. Cash flow systems are 
imperative and product cost systems are necessary to all processing plants. 
Milk marketing cooperatives in and around Ohio should consider the need 
for facilities to handle surplus milk. This consideration should be made 
jointly by all cooperatives in the area. One large operation would be more 
practical than several small processing plants. 
